SURVEY OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

IN NEW JERSEY LAW
In this section, the Seton Hall Law Review presents synopses of
recent New Jersey cases of interest to practitioners. In so doing, we
hope to assist the legal community in keeping abreast of some of the
more interestingchanges in significant areas of practice.
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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW-CASINO

CONTROL COMMISSION NOT REQUIRED TO HOLD FACTUAL HEARING PRIOR TO PROMULGATING REGU-

Manufacturing Co. v. New Jersey Casino Control
Commission, 85 N.J. 325, 426 A.2d 1000 (1981).
LATION-Bally

The New Jersey Constitution was amended in 1976 to allow the
establishment of casino gambling in Atlantic City. N.J. CONST. art.
IV, § 7, para. 2 (1947, amended 1976). Subsequently, the Casino
Control Commission was created through the Casino Control Act in
order to supervise and regulate gambling. The Act granted the Commission broad power to regulate the operations of casinos. N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 5:12-69 (West Cum. Supp. 1981-1982). The purpose of the
Act was "to regulate, control and prevent economic concentration in
the casino operations and the ancillary industries regulated by this
act, and to encourage and preserve competition." Id. § 5:12-1(b)(12).
In fulfilling its statutory responsibilities, the Commission discovered that up to one-half of total casino revenues were derived from
slot machines. 85 N.J. at 329, 426 A.2d at 1002. The market for these
slot machines was controlled by a single manufacturer, Bally Manufacturing Corporation. Apparently, Bally sold nearly eighty-percent
of the machines purchased in the domestic market. Id. As a result, the

Commission attempted to limit the sale of slot machines produced by
a single manufacturer. In 1978, a regulation was proposed which
would prevent a casino from purchasing fifty-percent or more of these
machines from a single manufacturer. Id.

Bally Manufacturing Corporation, the plaintiff, asked the Commission to hold a factual hearing prior to the adoption of the proposed
regulation. The Commission decided that although counsel would be
allowed at a public hearing, "factual testimony through witnesses

would be inappropriate." Id. The regulation, N.J. ADMIN. CODE §
19:46-1.32, was then adopted as proposed. Id. at 330, 426 A.2d at
1002.
Pursuant to the adoption of the regulation, the Supreme Court of
New Jersey granted direct certification on a motion made by Bally.
Bally Manufacturing Corp. v. New Jersey Casino Control Commission, 84 N.J. 447, 420 A.2d 346 (1980). Bally claimed that since the
Act did not authorize the Commission to fix market shares, the regulation should be held to be invalid. Bally argued that although the Act
allowed the Commission to fix percentages in some areas, the Commission should not set quotas where, as in the case of slot machines,
this discretion had not been specified. Bally further argued that one of
the purposes of the Commission was "to prevent economic concentra-

tion and encourage and preserve competition," and, therefore, mere
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market leadership should not be limited where there is no showing of
monopoly or predatory practices. 85 N.J. at 330-31, 425 A.2d at 1003.
See also N.J. STAT. ANN. § 5:12-1(b)(12). Bally stated that its advantage in this particular market was due to superior quality and customer preference rather than predatory practices. According to Bally,
this contention represented a factual dispute, the resolution of which
would require an evidentiary hearing pursuant to N.J. STAT. ANN. §
52:14B-9(c)(West 1969). 85 N.J. at 332, 426 A.2d at 1003. Since Bally
was concededly the only slot machine manufacturer immediately affected by the regulation, it claimed that to deny such a hearing would
run counter not only to N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:14B-9(c), but also to
general principles of fair play and administrative due process. 85 N.J.
at 332, 426 A.2d at 1003.
The Supreme Court of New Jersey held that the Commission
properly exercised its rulemaking authority when it promulgated the
regulation. Id. at 337, 426 A.2d 1006. Justice Sullivan, writing for the
court, reasoned that the Commission was granted comprehensive
power over casinos and related industries. "Economic concentration"
was virtually equivalent to economic domination and, as a result,
"[s]uch economic power would have the clear potential for unfair
advantage." Id. at 331, 426 A.2d 1003. This is especially pertinent in
a case where, as here, the manufacturer is a casino business in competition with its customers. Id. at 331 n.3, 426 A.2d 1003 n.3.
The court rejected the argument that since Bally was the dominant manufacturer of slot machines, the regulation was necessarily
directed at the corporation in particular. The regulation was aimed at
"the fact of market domination and the resultant 'economic concentration.'" Id. at 333, 426 A.2d at 1004 (emphasis in original). The
court pointed out that the regulation would impartially affect any
other manufacturer which might attain a similar position of market
dominance. Id. This being the case, the court held that there was no
necessity for findings of fact and, therefore, no requirement for an
evidentiary hearing. This was a proper exercise of the rulemaking
authority granted to the Commission. Id.
The court also considered the fifty-percent limitation. The court
ruled that even though the limitation may have been arbitrary, as the
Commission gave no rationale for its choice, the percentage decided
upon did have a rational basis. Id. at 335, 426 A.2d at 1005. The
purpose of this limitation was to prohibit "undue economic concentration" which existed due to the control of eighty-percent of the domestic market slot machine sales by Bally. Id. The court also allowed for
the possibility of modification of the regulation if it proved to be
unfair. Id.
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Bally's final argument was posited on grounds that the regulation
violated state and federal antitrust laws. The court disagreed, however, finding that the Casino Control Act was immune from both the
New Jersey Antitrust Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 56:9-1 to 19 (West
Cum. Supp. 1981-1982), and the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7
(1976). The former Act does not apply to "any activity directed,
authorized or permitted by any law of this state." N.J. STAT. ANN. §
56:9-5(c) (West Cum. Supp. 1981-1982). In light of the court's finding
that the regulation in dispute was authorized under the Casino Control Act, the court found the exemption clause operative in this situation. 85 N.J. at 335, 426 A.2d at 1005. The court also found an
applicable immunity from the Sherman Act. Under Parkerv. Brown,
317 U.S. 341 (1943), state action is exempt from the provisions of the
Act. Id. at 335, 426 A.2d at 1005-06. Since in the court's opinion the
regulation met the "state action standards of being clearly authorized,
and supervised by the state," the Sherman Antitrust Act clearly did
not apply. Id. at 337, 426 A.2d at 1006.
In a concurring opinion, Justice Handler stressed the flexibility of
administrative agency proceedings. The distinction between rulemaking and adjudication requiring an evidentiary hearing is "subject
to broad guidelines which are derived from judicial decisions." Id. at
338, 426 A.2d at 1007 (Handler, J., concurring). In a dissenting
opinion, Justice Pashman stated that Bally should have been granted
an evidentiary hearing, though he declined to determine the capriciousness of the fifty-percent limitation. He stated that by "[1]abeling
the proceeding rule [making, the Commission] only begs the question." Id. at 347, 426 A.2d at 1011 (Pashman, J., dissenting). Since
Bally was the only manufacturer adversely affected, procedural due
process required a hearing. Id.
The court's decision greatly strengthens the power and discretion
of the Casino Control Commission. The purpose of the Casino Control Act was to prevent unsavory individuals and businesses from
becoming involved in the casino industry which has always had a less
than positive reputation. The decision grants the Commission quasilegislative power which will enhance its primary purpose. This case
takes another step in the direction of preferring strong regulatory
power of administrative agencies over procedural and administrative
due process.
D.T.K.
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ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE-DECISIONS

IN UNEMPLOYMENT

COMPENSATION CASES NOT REVIEWABLE BY OFFICE OF ADMINISTRA-

LAW- Unemployment-Employed Council of New Jersey, Inc.
v. John J. Horn, 85 N.J. 646, 428 A.2d 1305 (1981).
TIVE

The Unemployed-Employed Council of New Jersey asked the
Commissioner of the New Jersey Department of Labor and Industry
whether decisions rendered in contested unemployment compensation
cases by the department's appeal tribunal and the board of review
were appealable to the Office of Administrative Law. In response, the
Commissioner decided that the terms of the Administrative Law Act,
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:14F-8(b) (West 1970), excluded their review. 85
N.J. at 648, 428 A.2d at 1306. The chief administrative law judge, to
whom this question was also addressed, concurred in the result but
believed that the Act permitted the Commissioner to adjudge that
certain cases were not "contested," and, therefore, not subject to
appeal. The Council then requested a formal declaratory ruling from
the Commissioner, who affirmed his position and issued the ruling
supported by an Attorney General's Office Opinion. The Council
appealed to the superior court, appellate division, and the supreme
court subsequently certified the case. Id. at 649, 428 A.2d at 1307.
The court held that because the appeal tribunal and board of
review were "agency heads" under the Office of Administrative Law
statute, their determinations constituted "the highest authority ...
authorized or required by law to render an adjudication in a contested
case." N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:14B-2(d) (West 1970); 85 N.J. at 659, 428
A.2d at 1312. As such, their decisions were not reviewable by the
Office of Administrative Law.
The court acknowledged that the statute reflected an effort to
reform the administrative hearing structure. Id. at 649, 428 A.2d at
1307. The former system allowed agency employees to hear cases as
"presiding officers." Because they were accountable to agency heads,
employees were likely to render biased decisions for the agency. Id. at
650, 428 A.2d at 1307. To minimize this conflict the new law permits
appeal to an independent hearing officer within the Office of Administrative Law. Id. at 649, 428 A.2d at 1307. Thus, the legislature
intended to create a more impartial review process for contested cases.
Id. at 650, 428 A.2d at 1307.
The Act requires that an administrative law judge hear unemployment compensation cases which are not excluded from its purview. Id. at 651, 428 A.2d at 1308. Subsection 8 excludes cases "where
the head of the agency, a commissioner or several commissioners, are
required to conduct, or determine to conduct the hearing directly and
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individually." N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:14F-8(b); 85 N.J. at 652, 428
A.2d at 1308. The Commissioner argued that both agencies were
comprised of "decisional officers" who rendered decisions as agency
heads and, therefore, were within the statutory exclusion. Furthermore, the statute governing unemployment claims empowered both
bodies to hear claims "directly and individually."
The court noted that the state unemployment compensation law
was drafted to comply with a federal requirement that an "impartial
tribunal" decide compensation cases. Id. at 652-53, 428 A.2d at 1309.
The applicable provision mandates that a "deputy" render the initial
determination. Id. at 653, 428 A.2d at 1309. A claimant may then
request review by the intermediate level appeal tribunal. The judgment is final unless the claimant appeals to the board of review. The
board may in a final administrative action, "affirm, modify, or set
aside the decision of an appeal tribunal." Id. A party is entitled
thereafter to obtain judicial review of the matter. Id. at 654, 428 A.2d
at 1309.
Justice Handler, speaking for the majority, held that the board of
review determination clearly was exempt from review by the Office of
Administrative Law because that body was a "final appeal tribunal."
Id. Whether the intermediate level appeal tribunal also was excluded
from review depended on statutory analysis. In so determining, the
court believed that the Act was intended to eliminate bias when the
hearing and decision are bifurcated. Id. at 655, 428 A.2d at 1310. An
unacceptable determination would result if an agency head affirmed
an examiner's potentially prejudiced findings and recommendations.
Id. at 656, 428 A.2d at 1310. It noted, however, that the legislature
intended to preserve the alternative format in which an agency decisional officer conducts the hearing and renders the decision. Separation of the functions was not mandated by due process considerations,
notions of fairness, or statutory requirements. The bifurcated structure was, in fact, desirable because it allowed the higher level agency
personnel to apply their expertise to the case.
Thus, the statutory exclusion, which applied only to officers who
both heard cases and rendered decisions, "promote[d] integrity, cohesiveness and expertise in the administrative decisional process." Id. at
657, 428 A.2d at 1311. Because in the instant case a member of the
appeal tribunal conducted both functions, the member's determinations were statutorily excluded from review. Id. at 658, 428 A.2d at
1311. The majority noted other courts' recognition of the "full adjudicative powers" of the tribunal, and the "sharply defined administrative hierirchy" within which an appellant may dispute unemployment compensation claims. Emphasizing the narrowness of the
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holding, Justice Handler disagreed with the dissenting Justices' viewpoint that lower echelon personnel would routinely render judgments
as "agency head[s]" under this ruling. Id. at 658-59, 428 A.2d at 1312.
In their dissent, Justices Pashman and Pollock agreed that board
of review decisions were exempt under the statute, but concluded that
the appeal tribunal decisions were subject to review by an Office of
Administrative Law judge. Id. at 662-63, 428 A.2d at 1314 (Pashman
& Pollock, JJ., dissenting). Emphasizing the plain language of the
Act, the dissent maintained that the majority's constricted reading of
the statute did violence to the broad reforms anticipated by the legislature in creating the Office of Administrative Law. Id. at 663, 428
A.2d at 1314 (Pashman & Pollock, JJ., dissenting). The dissenting
justices did not believe that the legislature wished to distinguish bifurcated proceedings by providing statutory exclusions. Id. at 665, 428
A.2d at 1315 (Pashman & Pollock, JJ., dissenting).
Justices Pashman and Pollock argued that the appeal tribunal
was not an "agency" subject to the exclusion, but rather a group of
individual tribunals whose decisions were appealable. In addition, a
decision could not be "a complete adjudication" because if not appealed it automatically becomes a final adjudication by the board of
review. Id. at 666, 428 A.2d at 1316 (Pashman & Pollock, JJ., dissenting). Buttressing its rationale, the dissent concluded that the relationship of an administrative law judge to the head of the agency resembled that of the appeal tribunal to the board of review. Id. at 667, 428
A.2d at 1316 (Pashman & Pollock, JJ., dissenting).
The majority recognized that the existing administrative appeal
procedure for unemployment compensation cases is comprehensive
and independent. As such, the structure is not automatically infused
with agency bias. The decision is significant because it curtails the
scope of the newly created Office of Administrative Law, yet narrows
the outcome to the facts of the dispute. Thus, the court's holding is
likely to have a more limited impact on future decisions.
M.S.M.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-RIGHT

TO COUNSEL-RIGHT TO COUN-

SEL NOT IMPAMED WHEN PUBLIC DEFENDERS FROM SAME OFFICE

REPRESENT CO-DEFENDANTS-State v. Rogers,

177 N.J. Super. 365,

426 A.2d 1035 (App. Div. 1981).
On January 18, 1979, defendant Rogers and two co-defendants,
Kitt and Williams, were indicted for armed robbery and possession of
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handguns without a permit. 177 N.J. Super at 367, 426 A.2d at 1036.
A staff attorney from the public defender's office represented each
defendant. Rogers was found guilty at the trial, and he appealed,
claiming that representation of co-defendants by public defenders
from the same office resulted in an infringement upon the constitutional right to effective counsel and constituted "joint or dual representation" as defined by N.J. CT. R. 3:8-2 and State v. Bellucci, 81
N.J. 531, 410 A.2d 666 (1980).
Before commencement of trial, Rogers' public defender argued
for his client at a special hearing and stated that Rogers was apprehensive about confiding in him for fear that the other public defenders
might use the information against him at trial in defending their own
clients, Rogers' co-defendants. The law division denied Rogers' request for new counsel, dismissing his anxiety as untenable and paranoiac. The public defender's application to withdraw as counsel was
also denied. 177 N.J. Super. at 367-69, 426 A.2d at 1036-37. The day
before trial, the public defender again sought to withdraw from the
case, expressing his difficulty in obtaining information from his client.
This request was also denied. Id. at 369, 426 A.2d at 1037.
The court distinguished the facts in Rogers from those in Bellucci. In Bellucci, the New Jersey supreme court held that where two
partners from the same law firm represent criminal co-defendants,
the partnership effectively acts as one attorney. This presents a potential conflict, and prejudice automatically is presumed. Furthermore,
"when two public defenders from the same office represent conflicting
interests," the sixth amendment and an attorney's professional responsibility are compromised. 81 N.J. at 542 n.3, 410 A.2d at 676 n.3
(emphasis in original). Using this criteria, the appellate court found
that "no conflicting interest" existed. 177 N.J. Super. at 373, 426 A.2d
at 1039.
In reaching this conclusion, the appellate court invoked that
standard for "actual conflict" as set forth in Glasser v. United States,
315 U.S. 60 (1941). In Glasser, the Court found that the defendant's
right to effective counsel had been denied when his defense counsel
failed to cross-examine a witness whose testimony might have injured
the case of a co-defendant, whom counsel also represented. In Rogers,
however, the culpability of the defendants did not require significantly different theories of defense, and all the defenses appeared
harmonious. Noting the earnestness with which Rogers' counsel presented the case, the court believed there was no reason to suspect that
Rogers' defense was prejudiced. Furthermore, the court implied that
Rogers was merely using dilatory tactics to forestall trial. 177 N.J.
Super. at 375, 426 A.2d at 1040.
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The Rogers holding makes it impossible to automatically mandate a change of counsel every time a defendant's attorney is from the
same public defender's office as his co-defendants' counsel. The court
accomplishes this by requiring a more stringent determination of
what, if any, "actual conflicts" exist in representation. Although the
holding may work in favor of the public defender system, it may not
always be in the best interest of the client since an "actual conflict"
may be difficult to prove until after trial. Perhaps it may save courts
from frivolous claims of prejudice designed only to delay a prompt
trial.
P. W.

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-APPLICATION
TO

ISSUE

AND

EXECUTE SEARCH

OF

NEW JERSEY STATUTES

AND EXTRADITION WARRANTS IN CO-

OPERATION WITH CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS BY FOREIGN STATE-In

re

Mahler, 177 N.J. Super. 337, 426 A.2d. 1021 (App. Div. 1981).
Hudson Oil Refining Corporation (Hudson Oil), a New Jersey
hazardous industrial waste carrier, and a group of its officers and
employees were allegedly engaged in an illegal scheme involving massive dumping of hazardous waste into the Susquehanna River. Hudson Oil transported waste by tank carrier to an abandoned mine shaft
in Pittston, Pennsylvania, where its employees would allegedly pour
the waste into the shaft by way of a bore hole. The waste seeped into
the river causing significant contamination.
The scheme was uncovered by Pennsylvania officials after receiving an anonymous tip implicating Hudson Oil. Relying on an affidavit
of the regional solid waste manager for the Pennsylvania Department
of Environmental Resources who had specific knowledge of the case,
the officials requested the New Jersey Attorney General to apply for a
search warrant authorizing the search of the Hudson Oil premises in
Edgewater, New Jersey. The warrant was issued by a law division
judge on October 2, 1979, pursuant to N.J. CT. R. 3:5-2. Two officers
of the New Jersey Division of Criminal Justice and various Pennsylvania officials executed the warrant the next day and seized numerous
documents of the corporation. The documents were transfered to the
custody of the Pennsylvania officials pending a grand jury investigation. The Pennsylvania Multi-County Investigating Grand Jury returned a presentment against Hudson Oil, Russell Mahler, president
of Hudson Oil, Kenneth Mansfield, its truck dispatcher, and four of
its drivers.
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Hudson Oil petitioned the superior court for an order, pursuant
to N.J. CT. R. 3:5-7(a), to suppress the evidence seized by the New
Jersey and Pennsylvania officals. The trial judge denied the petition,
stating that he was "without jurisdiction to suppress evidence intended for use in another state." 177 N.J. Super. at 344, 426 A.2d at
1024. Hudson Oil appealed the denial of this order.
Meanwhile, Pennsylvania had initiated extradition proceedings
against all the defendants. The Governor of New Jersey issued arrest
warrants and amended arrest warrants against the six individual defendants pursuant to N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:160-11, 14 (West 1971).
The defendants challenged the warrants by way of individual habeas
corpus petitions. At a consolidated hearing, the trial judge denied the
petitions holding that there was "no vitiating defect in the extradition
proceedings." 177 N.J. Super. at 344, 426 A.2d at 1024. The defendants appealed from the trial judge's orders directing their extradition
to Pennsylvania. These appeals were consolidated with the appeals
from the order denying suppression relief.
Judge Pressler, delivering the opinion of the court, affirmed all
the lower court orders. In response to the order denying suppression
relief, the court held that the defendants' reliance on N.J. CT. R.
3:5-7(a) rested upon a "serious misconception of its remedial scope."
177 N.J. Super. at 345, 426 A.2d at 1025. Judge Pressler, citing Bivens
v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics,
403 U.S. 388 (1971), referred to the exclusionary rule as " 'simply
irrelevant' absent an ensuing prosecution." 177 N.J. Super. at 346,
426 A.2d at 1025 (quoting Bivens, 403 U.S. at 410). Absent any
threatened or pending prosecution in New Jersey, the court reasoned
that it lacked standing to rule on a motion which would affect a
pending action in another sovereign jurisdiction.
The court's denial of suppression relief was analogous to the
constraints imposed on federal district courts by the demands of federalism. In making this comparison, the court supported its reasoning
by citing Steffanelli v. Minard, 342 U.S. 117 (1951), which held that
federal district courts cannot interfere with state criminal proceedings
by suppressing evidence allegedly obtained in an unlawful manner.
Similar restraints between conflicting state courts were only logical
according to Judge Pressler.
The defendants' second appeal challenging the extradition orders
was also denied. Appellants Mahler and Mansfield first contended
that since their amended arrest warrants were issued pursuant to N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2A: 160-14, the non-fugitive provision of the statute, the
Governor could use his discretion in surrendering them to Pennsylva-
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nia. Accordingly, they claimed a right to a hearing before the Governor. The court rejected their argument declaring that the "discretionary nature of the gubernatorial function [does not] mandat[e] a
hearing as a prerequisite to a valid exercise of discretion." 177 N.J.
Super. at 354, 426 A.2d at 1029. The appellants were afforded, and in
fact took advantage of the opportunity to submit papers in opposition
to Pennsylvania's request when they were given notice of the proceeding two months prior to the issuance of the warrants by New Jersey's
Governor. Since there is no constitutional or statutory hearing requirement, the Governor's exercise of executive discretion was proper
under the circumstances.
The court also rejected the appellants' challenge to the state's
motion to quash the subpoena requiring the Governor to testify at the
habeas corpus hearing. Citing New Jersey Turnpike Authority v.
Sisselman, 106 N.J. Super. 358, 255 A.2d 810 (App. Div.), certif.
denied, 54 N.J. 565, 258 A.2d 16 (1969), the court affirmed that the
Governor could not be compelled to appear at a habeas corpus hearing to justify the exercise of his discretionary authority. In addition,
the court rejected the appellants' contention that the arrest and
amended arrest warrants failed to show probable cause. According to
Michigan v. Doran, 439 U.S. 282 (1978), any inquiry regarding such
warrants is limited to essentially three questions: first, whether the
warrants charge a crime; second, the identity of the person named in
the extradition request; and third, whether that person is categorically
subject to extradition. The court took the Doran doctrine a step
further by including non-fugitive, as well as fugitive, extradition
within its holding.
The appellants next argued that Pennsylvania's charging documents failed to meet the technical requirements of N.J. STAT. ANN. §
2A:160 -11, -14, -15 (West 1971). The court held that "it is clearly
sufficient to charge them with the commission of an act in New Jersey
intentionally resulting in a crime in Pennsylvania." 177 N.J. Super. at
356, 426 A.2d at 1030. Appellant drivers finally argued that the
offenses charged did not constitute crimes as mandated by N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 2A:160-10 (West 1971). By analyzing the definition of a
crime, and the penalties involved for violating the Pennsylvania environmental legislation, see PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 691.301, .602(b),
.307 (Purdon 1977), the court found that the violations charged were
within the ambit of the New Jersey statute. By relying on the broad
extradition principles espoused in 4 U.S.C. § 112(a) (1971), the court
also rejected appellants' argument that the New Jersey Extradition
Act is unconstitutional.
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This case clearly defines the boundaries of cooperation established by state sovereignty principles when a New Jersey defendant
has violated another state's laws. Although most of the decision reaffirms these boundaries, the court has shown a tendency to liberalize
the constraints imposed by state sovereignty in two respects. First, the
court has shown a readiness to implicate the non-fugitive defendant
along the same guidelines as the fugitive defendant. Second, the court
has indicated a willingness to broadly interpret foreign-state laws to
accommodate New Jersey statutes. This latter tendency could have
significant effects in the environmental area where judicial cooperation between neighboring states is essential to the prosecution of those
who violate environmental laws aimed at protecting the public.
M.S.

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-PAROLE- RESTITUTION
CONDITION OF PAROLE FOR CONVICTED

CANNOT

BE

MuRDE-ER-In re ParoleAp-

plication of Thomas Trantino, 177 N.J. Super. 499, 427 A.2d 91
(App. Div. 1981).
The parole application of Thomas Trantino presented the question whether a convicted murderer could be required to pay restitution as a condition of parole. In the early 1960's, Trantino was convicted for the murder of two police officers in Bergen County.
Trantino was originally sentenced to be executed, but his sentence was
changed to life imprisonment when the death penalty was abolished
in New Jersey. Trantino became eligible for parole in 1979. Trantino's
original application to the parole board for his release was denied. 177
N.J. Super. at 505, 427 A.2d at 94. His later application, considered
subsequent to the enactment of the Parole Act of 1979, N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 30:4-123.45 (West 1981), was approved subject to satisfaction

of certain parole conditions. Chief among these conditions was the

requirement that Trantino make restitution to the survivors of the
murder victims. 177 N.J. Super. at 506, 427 A.2d at 94. The parole
board purported to derive its authority to impose this condition from
language contained in the then recently enacted parole law. The
statute authorized the imposition of reasonable parole conditions including, but not requiring, restitution "the amount of which. . . shall
be set by the sentencing court upon request of the board." N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 30:4-123.59(b).
Accordingly, in July, 1980, the parole board notified the assignment judge of Bergen County and requested the court to fix the
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amount of Trantino's ordered restitution. In an oral opinion, Judge
Trautwein refused to fix an amount in restitution, reasoning that the
parole act did not contemplate the use of restitution in cases of intentional murder. He also held that Trantino was not entitled to release
because this parole condition could not be satisfied. 177 N.J. Super. at
507, 427 A.2d at 95.
In November, 1980, the parole board again convened and decided to parole Trantino "no earlier than December 23, 1980," subject, however, to an ultimate court determination of the validity of
restitution as a precondition to parole. Id. at 508, 427 A.2d at 96.
Two appeals followed. On November 20 the parole board appealed
from Judge Trautwein's order declining to fix an amount in restitution. On December 17, Trantino appealed from the parole board's
November decision to delay parole. The appellate division denied
Trantino's application for interim relief which requested release from
prison pending the outcome of his appeal. The court consolidated
both appeals, however, and set the matter down for an expedited
hearing. Id. at 509, 427 A.2d at 96. Amicus curiae briefs opposing
Trantino's release were permitted to be filed on behalf of the New
Jersey State Policemen's Benevolent Association, the Bergen County
Police Chief's Association, and the family of one of the victims.
Trantino's position on appeal was that he was entitled to immediate parole release "pending determination of the amount of restitution," and that the lower court's refusal to fix this sum bound the
parole board. Id. at 509, 427 A.2d at 96. Trantino further argued that
the Parole Act never intended restitution to be ordered in homicide
cases, and that even if it had so intended, it was beyond the power of
the legislature to sanction the payment of restitution as a precondition
to parole. The parole board argued that the condition of restitution
had been authorized by the Parole Act and was entirely appropriate in
Trantino's case. Id.
In a unanimous decision, written by Judge Greenberg, the appellate division held that the legislature had intended, through the Parole
Act, to authorize the ordering of restitution as a condition of parole
only in the case of crimes economic in nature. Restitution could be
employed to recover the "fruits of the crime," and to return what was
taken directly to the victims of the offense. Notwithstanding the
court's decision that restitution could not validly be made a condition
of Trantino's parole, the court determined that Trantino was not
entitled to release at that time. Id. at 511, 427 A.2d at 97. The court
found that the parole board had authorized Trantino's parole only if
the restitution condition were satisfied. Id. at 515, 427 A.2d at 98.
The board, the court reasoned, must now have the opportunity to
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determine whether Trantino had been rehabilitated, and therefore
eligible for parole independently of this condition.
In reaching its decision on the issue of restitution as a precondition for parole, the court pointed out the distinction which the legislature had implicitly recognized between restitution and reparation in
the case of criminal offenses. Id. at 517, 427 A.2d at 101. The court
indicated that recent changes in the statute governing probation were
indicative of the legislative intent behind the new parole law. The law
governing probation originally authorized the court to require the
defendant to "make reparation or restitution to the aggrieved parties
for the damage or loss caused by the offense." N.J. STAT. ANN. §
2A:168-2 (West 1971). 177 N.J. Super. at 518, 427 A.2d at 101. The
law was changed, however, to provide that as a precondition for
probation the defendant "make restitution of the fruits of his offense,
in an amount he can afford to pay, for the loss or damage caused
thereby." N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:45-lb(8) (West 1981). The court
added that the earlier distinction between restitution and reparation
had also been drawn quite clearly in Ex rel. D. G. W., 70 N.J. 488, 361
A.2d 513 (1976), and State v. Harris,70 N.J. 586, 362 A.2d 32 (1976),
involving the issue of restitution in the context of juvenile proceedings
and welfare fraud, respectively.
The court indicated that the legislature, by its recent amendment, must have intended a substantive change in the scope of restitution as applied in the case of probation. Because the language contained in both the old Parole Act and the recent amendments was
entirely silent on the issue of reparation, the court reasoned that the
legislature intended to limit the condition for parole which could be
imposed upon an inmate to "make restitution for his crime." N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 30:4-123.6; 177 N.J. Super. at 522, 427 A.2d at 102.
The court concluded that the new Parole Act's failure to mention
reparation, particularly in view of the recent modifications in the law
governing probation, was a clear indication of the legislature's intent
to limit that section to a parolee's making of restitution alone. Restitution contemplates a return of the "fruits" of a criminal offense directly
to the party aggrieved; reparation embraces the larger remedy of an
award to some third party for injury inflicted indirectly by the criminal's conduct. Id. The court indicated that Trantino's case fell within
this latter category, and that it was not within the parole board's
authority to order reparation as a condition for parole.
The court's construction of the restitution provision contained in
the new parole law is fully consistent with the underlying purpose of
that law. The criteria for determining whether a prisoner is entitled to
parole are the extent of rehabilitation and an evaluation of whether
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the inmate, if released, would pose a continued danger to society.
Arguably, where property crimes are involved, a requirement that the
parolee make restitution to the victim of the criminal offense has
rehabilitative value. The prisoner should rightfully be required to
surrender any "fruits" of his crime as a condition to his freedom. The
same is not true of reparation. To require reparation as a condition of
parole in such situations injects a punitive element into the parole
process. The parole board's decision to grant or deny parole in such
situations should turn instead exclusively on the issue of whether the
prisoner has become sufficiently rehabilitated to no longer endanger
society.
The Trantino court's qualified construction of restitution as a
condition of parole suggests its unwillingness to ignore the underlying
purpose of the Parole Act. This suggests that restitution as a condition
of parole will be considered only in those cases in which the "remedy"
is suited to the crime, and when the underlying legislative purpose of
imposing the condition will be advanced.
M.M.R.

DOMESTIC RELATIONS-ALIMONY AND MAINTENANCE-NONCONTRIBUTORY "VESTED" PENSION PLANS WHICH WILL PROVIDE FUTURE
MONETARY

BENEFITS

TO

HUSBAND

EQUITABLY

DISTRIBUTABLE-

Kikkert v. Kikkert, 177 N.J. Super. 471, 427 A.2d 76 (App. Div.
1981).
Respondent, Martin Kikkert, Jr., will be entitled to full pension
benefits in thirteen years at age sixty-two. 177 N.J. Super. at 473, 427
A.2d at 77. He has been employed by Continental Can Company for
longer than the requisite ten years necessary for his noncontributory
pension plan to vest. Id. at 474, 427 A.2d at 77-78. Kikkert will collect
his pension provided only that he survives. He need not continue his
employment with the company, and there are specifications for payments should Kikkert become disabled, or should the plant cease to
operate. Furthermore, he may choose to accept earlier pension benefits at a reduced rate at age sixty. Id.
The superior court, chancery division, held that these pension

rights were not subject to equitable distribution because respondent
could not withdraw the funds until some future time. Id. at 475-76,
427 A.2d at 118. The trial judge relied on Mueller v. Mueller, 166
N.J. Super. 557, 400 A.2d 136 (Ch. Div. 1979), in rejecting the
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proposition that the pension should be subject to equitable distribution. 177 N.J. Super. at 475-76, 427 A.2d at 78. Although Weir v.
Weir, 173 N.J. Super. 130, 413 A.2d 638 (Ch. Div. 1980), held that
equitable distribution was available for vested pension plans, it had
not been published at the time of the trial judge's decision. 177 N.J.
Super. at 474, 427 A.2d at 79. Therefore, the superior court, appellate
division, agreed to hear the case in light of the two contrary trial court
positions. Id.
Judge Polow, reversing the lower court decision, noted that in all
of the decisions prior to Mueller and Weir, the courts permitted
equitable distribution of pension rights if the pensioner had an extant
right to receive a present benefit. Id. at 475, 427 A.2d at 79. In the
instant case, the employee already qualified for benefits, and, therefore, it was proper that they be included for distribution. Id. at 476,
427 A.2d at 80.
The Mueller court"relied on Mey v. Mey, 79 N.J. 121, 398 A.2d
88 (1979), in espousing its decision. 166 N.J. Super. at 560-61, 400
A.2d at 137. Mey involved a trust fund, and the New Jersey supreme
court held that for real or personal property to be equitably distributed, there must be a present capacity to control or use the property.
79 N.J. at 124-25, 398 A.2d at 89. The Kikkert court held that Mey
not only did not apply in the case at bar, but also that it was not
intended to apply to pension rights. 177 N.J. Super. at 478, 427 A.2d
at 78-79. Therefore, according to the court, the controlling case was
Weir. Id. In that case, Judge Serpentelli recognized that each spouse
would have relied upon the pension as a source of income for the
future. 173 N.J. Super. at 138, 413 A.2d at 640.
The appellate court recognized that N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:34-23
(West 1952 & Cum. Supp. 1980-1981) authorized it to equitably
distribute both personal and real property which were "legally and
beneficially acquired" during the marriage. 177 N.J. Super. at 474,
427 A.2d at 78. Thus, the court believed that attention should be
focused on whether these benefits were "vested." Id. at 475, 427 A.2d
at 78. Pension benefits have been recognized as distributable assets
because the other spouse has "foregone enjoyment of that additional
compensation represented by the cost of the plan whether or not it
requires employee contributions." Id. at 476-77, 427 A.2d at 79.
Therefore, the court concluded that the respondent's right to receive
money in the future should be subject to equitable distribution. The
amount of distribution would be based upon the present value of the
pension plan. Id. at 475, 427 A.2d at 79-80.
Recognizing the difficulties in determining present value, the
court gave some guidelines for the trial court to follow on remand. Id.
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at 477-78, 427 A.2d at 79-80. If the present value of the pension plan
can be determined, and the other spouse's share calculated, then
immediate settlement is preferred over deferred payment to avoid
protracting "strife and hostility." Id. The amount may best be taken
out of other assets so as to leave the employee with the pension
benefits. Id. The court held that actuarial computations must be
included in the present value computations when the benefits depend
upon the survival of the employee. Id. at 478, 427 A.2d at 79. Conversely, if the assets are inadequate, or if the present value cannot be
ascertained, the trial judge should order some form of deferred distribution based on a fixed percentage division of the pension benefits
when received. Id.
The Kikkert decision was the first reported appellate opinion on
equitable distribution of vested pension plans. In applying the Weir
decision, the court clarified this complex matter and the problems
that inhere in it, while also expanding the scope of distributable assets
in divorce settlements.
K.B.

FEES-ARBITRATION AND AwARD-COMPULSORY ARBITRATION OF ATTORNEY FEES UNDER N.J. CT. R. 1:20A CONSTITUTIONAL-In re
Application of Divorce, 85 N.J. 576, 428 A.2d 268 (1981).
Philip Li Volsi, a New Jersey attorney, brought an action challenging the constitutionality of fee arbitration committees as established by N.J. CT. R. 1:20A. 85 N.J. at 576, 428 A.2d at 268. The rule
in controversy provides for compulsory binding arbitration of fee
disputes at the request of the client, regardless of whether the attorney
consents, and permits binding arbitration at the request of the attorney if the client consents. The decisions of fee arbitration committees
are not appealable. N.J. CT. R. 1:20A-3(c). Li Volsi presented two
issues of first impression to the court: whether the rule was constitutional, and if constitutional, whether the rule should be amended to
provide for some form of appeal from the decision of the fee arbitration committee. 85 N.J. at 576, 428 A.2d at 268. Li Volsi contended
that the rule was unconstitutional because it was beyond the scope of
the authority of the New Jersey supreme court to promulgate the rule;
it denied lawyers equal protection of the laws; it denied lawyers the
right to trial by jury; and by denying a right to appeal, it violated the
due process clauses of the fourteenth amendment and the New Jersey
Constitution. Id. at 582, 428 A.2d at 1270.
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Li Volsi originally brought an action against the New Jersey
supreme court in the United States District Court for the District of
New Jersey. Id., 428 A.2d at 1271. While the action was pending, the
New Jersey supreme court took the highly unusual action of inviting
Li Volsi to bring his action before it. Li Volsi argued the case and the
New Jersey State Bar Association joined as amicus curiae. Id. The
supreme court based this unusual exercise of original jurisdiction on
article VI, section II, paragraph 3 of the New Jersey Constitution,
which provides that the supreme court shall have original jurisdiction
over the discipline of persons admitted to the Bar. Writing for the
court, Chief Justice Wilentz conceded that no party had raised a
jurisdictional issue. Nonetheless, he felt obligated to explain the
court's exercise of jurisdiction. Id. at 582-84, 428 A.2d at 1271-72.
This case is procedurally unique because the practice of "invitation"
from the state supreme court out of federal court is not favored. The
usual procedure is for the federal court to decline to exercise jurisdiction pending state review.
The court held that promulgation of the rule was a legitimate
exercise of its authority. By analogizing to the last case to challenge
the court's authority over the control of the attorney-client fee relationship, American Trial Lawyers v. New Jersey Supreme Court, 126
N.J. Super. 577, 316 A.2d 19 (App. Div.), aff'd, 65 N.J. 258, 330 A.2d
356 (1974), the court found that if it has the authority to control the
substance of the fee relationship, then a fortiori, it has the power to
determine the procedure for resolving fee disputes. 85 N.J. at 586, 428
A.2d at 1273.
In reaching its decision the court dealt with three major arguments. Li Volsi argued that the rule was unconstitutional because an
appeal of right from the fee arbitration committee's decision is guaranteed by article VI, section V, paragraph 4 of the New Jersey Constitution, which created actions in lieu of prerogative writ. Id. at 592,
428 A.2d at 1276. The court rejected this argument, finding that
prerogative writs were never used to review actions of judicially created agencies. Actions in lieu of prerogative writs lie only in cases
where a remedy is available under a traditional prerogative writ. Id.
at 594, 428 A.2d at 1277. The equal protection argument raised by Li
Volsi and the Bar Association was also rejected based upon a finding
that attorneys are not a "suspect class," and thus only a rational basis
supporting different treatment of attorneys is needed to validate the
rule. The court found a rational basis in the need to provide a swift
inexpensive remedy for the clients objection to the fee. Id. at 586-87,
428 A.2d at 1273. Finally, Li Volsi argued that attorneys were being
denied due process because the rule allegedly abrogated their right to
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trial by jury in fee disputes. The court rejected this argument on two
grounds: attorneys did not previously have an absolute right to trial
by jury over disputed fees; and, recognizing such a right would undermine the supreme court's authority over the Bar. Id. at 587, 428 A.2d
at 1273.
Chief Justice Wilentz delineated the principal policy reasons for
requiring compulsory fee arbitration: avoidance of unwarranted time
delays and expenses which the client would incur in litigating fee
disputes, and resultant damage to the reputation of the Bar. Id. at
599, 428 A.2d at 1280. The recurrent theme underlying all the reasoning in the opinion, however, is that the New Jersey supreme court has
and will maintain absolute authority over the conduct of members of
the Bar. Id. at 583, 586, 587, 590, 591, 428 A.2d at 1271, 1272, 1273,
1274, 1275. Furthermore, justification for the court's imposition of
the special responsibility to submit to arbitration was found in the
many rights and privileges enjoyed by members of the legal profession. Id. at 600, 428 A.2d at 1280.
The court rejected the contention that the rule should be
amended to allow for an appeal on the merits. Id. at 603, 428 A.2d at
1282. The court recommended that the Civil Practice Committee
investigate the issue and make recommendations to the court regarding an amendment that would grant a limited right of appeal to the
Disciplinary Review Board based upon procedural defects in the original hearing. Id.
Justice Schreiber concurred with the court to uphold the rule. He
indicated, however, that the decision restricting appeals to alleged
procedural defects was premature. He would have preferred to have
input from all interested parties before making a decision as to the
nature of appeals. Justice Schreiber indicated a willingness to consider
appeals on the merits. Id. at 605, 428 A.2d at 1283 (Schreiber, J.,
concurring).
The unique aspect of the court's decision lies not in the holding,
which was expected in light of the ruling on the previous challenge to
the court's authority to regulate fees, see American Trial Attorneys,
but rather in the court's procedural device of "inviting" a claimant/attorney to bring his suit directly to the forum. The court has aggressively sought to affirm its sole and absolute authority to regulate the
conduct of members of the Bar. Based upon this opinion, it appears
that the Wilentz court will be an activist court in this area.
M.C.

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

LANDLORD AND TENANT-MORTGAGES-NEw
EvIcrION AcT DOES NOT AFFEcT

[Vol. 12:152
JERSEY'S ANTI-

MORTGAGEE'S RIGHTS IN FOBECLO-

suRE AcTioN-Guttenberg Savings and Loan Association v. Rivera,
85 N.J. 617, 428 A.2d 1289 (1981).
In 1966, John Scirocco and Frank Annese obtained a loan of
$30,000 from Guttenberg Savings and Loan Association (Guttenberg)
to purchase a residential apartment building in Jersey City. 85 N.J. at
620, 428 A.2d at 1291. A purchase money mortgage was given to
Guttenberg as security. When, in 1978, the payments due on the loan
were not met, Guttenberg instituted foreclosure proceedings. Several
defendants were joined in the suit, including five tenants of the apartment building who were in residence. These tenancies were created
after the mortgage was recorded. In part, the complaint filed on
behalf of Guttenberg requested that the property be sold to satisfy the
debt, and demanded possession of the premises in accordance with the
terms of the mortgage.
Four of the tenants moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to
state a claim upon which relief may be granted. The tenants argued
that the mortgagee was not entitled to possession unless it complied
with the Anti-Eviction Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:18-61.1 (West 1974
& Cum. Supp. 1981-1982). This legislation forbids a landlord to evict
a tenant except for statutory causes.
The trial court held that the Anti-Eviction Act did not affect a
mortgagee's right to possession upon default of the mortgagor since
the Act "applied only to summary dispossess actions instituted in the
district court." 85 N.J. at 621, 428 A.2d at 1291. Guttenberg then
moved for a motion to strike the defendant's answer. The tenants filed
a cross-motion for summary judgment. The motion was supported by
three tenants' affidavits, which cited, in part, their inability to remain
in a residence due to the uninhabitable condition of the building. At
oral argument the defendants also claimed their right to attorn,
thereby creating a new landlord-tenant relationship subject to the
Anti-Eviction Act. Again the trial court held firm to its previous
decision and granted the plaintiff's motion to strike the answer. A
final judgment set the date for the sale of the premises on March 30,
1979. The sale resulted in a third party purchase of the property.
On appeal by the defendants, the appellate division found that
the tenants still had a sufficient stake in the outcome of the case to
confer justiciability. The court went on to state, however, that it was
not able to decide the tenants' right to reoccupy the building after
rehabilitation because the property was purchased by a non-party to
the suit. Id. at 622, 428 A.2d at 1292. The appellate division reversed
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the lower court's decision. The court reasoned that since the purpose
of the Anti-Eviction Act was to prevent tenants from being arbitrarily
evicted, and the Act applied to both removal proceedings in the
superior court and county district court, the legislature must have
intended to include foreclosing mortgagees within application of the
Act. The supreme court granted certification and held that the AntiEviction Act does not apply to a mortgagee's rights. Therefore, the
mortgagee could evict the tenants without complying with the AntiEviction Act.
The supreme court first considered whether the case was moot
because of the uninhabitability of the premises and the purchase of
the building by a third party. Because the tenants planned to move
back into the apartments, and because of the public importance of the
issues, the court resolved to address the merits. Id. at 6XX, 428 A.2d
at 1XXX.
The substantive issue addressed in this case was "whether a foreclosing mortgagee of a residential apartment building may obtain a
Superior Court order evicting tenants under leases subordinate to the
mortgage without complying with the Anti-Eviction Act." Id. at 62324, 428 A.2d at 1292. To resolve this question the court began an
inquiry into the legislative intent. The court considered each section of
the Act to determine the precise meaning of the terms. The court
chose to give these terms a narrow construction, concluding that if the
legislature had intended to extend the Act to persons other than
landlords they would have specifically done so. Id. at 623-24, 428
A.2d at 1293.
As further evidence of the legislature's intent to apply these restrictions solely to landlords, the court noted that the Act was located
within a statutory scheme of landlord-tenant law. Id. at 624, 428
A.2d at 1293. The court relied on the fact that in 1974, N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 2A:18-53, which deals with summary dispossess actions, was
amended to exclude "residential lessees and tenants," who then became subject to the Anti-Eviction Act. This suggested to the court that
the legislature intended the Act to apply only to landlords and tenants. 85 N.J. at 625, 428 A.2d at 1293. Additional indications of
legislative intent were found in a statement made by one of the Act's
principal drafters, K. Meiser, and records of hearings before the New
Jersey Assembly Committee on Commerce, Industry and Professions.
Id. at 625-26, 428 A.2d at 1294.
In support of this analysis of legislative intent, the court considered the traditional right of a mortgagee in property law to obtain
possession against a subordinate tenant. Id. at 626-27, 428 A.2d at
1294-95. Again, the court reasoned that if the legislature had intended
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to alter these established rights it would have specifically stated so in
the Anti-Eviction Act. Id. at 627, 428 A.2d at 1295. The court further
argued that the liberal construction rule did not apply here because
the mortgagee is an unintended subject of the Act. Id. at 628, 428
A.2d at 1295.
The court criticized the rationale which both the trial court and
the appellate division applied in their interpretation of the superior
court's role in enforcing the Act. The majority indicated that the trial
court erred in limiting the superior court's jurisdiction to those claims
made in county district court and removed to superior court. According to the supreme court, the appellate division mistakenly ruled that
the Act applied to any removal proceeding despite the status of the
opposing party. The appellate court's ruling was also criticized in that
it failed to consider the impact that holding would have on other areas
of property law such as tax sale foreclosures, condemnations, and
quiet title actions. Id. at 629, 428 A.2d at 1296.
The supreme court rebutted the defendant's claims of mortgagees
being owners under the terms of the Act by relying once more on the
hearings before the New Jersey Assembly Committee on Commerce,
Industry and Professions, and use of the term in N.J. STAT. ANN. §
2A:18-61.1(g)-(1). 85 N.J. at 629, 428 A.2d at 1296. The tenants'
contention that attornment had established a new landlord-tenant
relationship was refuted when the court concluded that attornment
could not take place because the mortgagee had not taken possession.
Id. at 630, 428 A.2d at 1296-97.
The court also relied in part on the amicus curiae briefs filed on
behalf of the New Jersey Savings League and Applied Housing Associates. These briefs argued the importance of differentiating between
mortgagees and landlords. Id. at 631-32, 428 A.2d at 1297-98. Finally, the court concluded that the Act only will apply to the mortgagee when its relationship with the residents is that of landlord-tenant.
Justice Pashman's dissent focused precisely on the majority's interpretation of the legislative intent. He criticized the majority's construction of the Act, claiming that the majority not only ignored the
broad purposes of the law, but undermined them as well. The dissent
asserted the necessity of preventing arbitrary eviction, notwithstanding whether the original landlord or a mortgagee caused it. Id. at 634,
428 A.2d at 1299 (Pashman, J., dissenting). In addition, the dissent
questioned the majority's assumption that the terms "landlord" and
"foreclosing mortgagee" were mutually exclusive within the context of
the Act. Id. at 635, 428 A.2d at 1299 (Pashman, J., dissenting).
The dissent's argument criticized both the artificial and narrow
reading given to the term "owner," and the majority's reliance on the
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records of the Public Hearing before the New Jersey Assembly Committee on Commerce, Industry and Professions. Justice Pashman contended that the majority used these records out of context, and that in
fact they did not relate to the Act in question. Id. at 635 n.1, 428 A.2d
at 1291 n.1 (Pashman, J., dissenting).
Finally, the dissent stressed the remedial aspect of the Act, and
urged that its language be broadly construed. Id. at 636, 428 A.2d at
1300 (Pashman, J., dissenting). According to this rationale, foreclosure would terminate a lease subordinate to the mortgage and a
periodic tenancy would arise between the mortgagee and tenant. This
circumstance would bring the tenant under the protection of the
Anti-Eviction Act and the mortgagee would be forced to comply with
its terms for eviction. Id. at 637, 428 A.2d at 1300 (Pashman, J.,
dissenting).
Although Justice Pashman's views may not be in accord with
traditional mortgage law, the arguments which he set forth effectively
rebut the majority's rationale. Substantial criticism has been directed
against the appellate court's applying the Act to mortgagees. See
Note, 11 SErON HALL L. REv. 311, 323 (1980). While it may be
economically and socially desirable to exlude mortgagees from the
restrictions imposed by the Act, the majority opinion fails to provide a
sound basis for doing so. In effect, the court failed to consider the
underlying reason for the enactment of the Anti-Eviction Act: protection of tenants in a time of increasing housing shortages. Justice
Pashman succinctly points out this error.
There can be no question that this issue is of vital concern today.
The supreme court's decision restores the status quo which was disrupted by the appellate court's holding, but fails to provide a rational
legal basis upon which other courts may rely.
L.C.

MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE-RuLE REQuIRING RADIOLOGISTS TO
PERF RM SERVICES FOR LIMITED LICENSEES VALID AND WITHIN AuTHORITY OF MEDICAL BoA.Pm-Brodie v. State Board of Medical
Examiners, 177 N.J. Super. 523, 427 A.2d 104 (App. Div. 1981).
Marvin Brodie, M.D., Mark Mishkin, M.D., the Radiological
Society of New Jersey, and the Medical Society of New Jersey instituted an appeal seeking review of a rule promulgated by the State
Board of Medical Examiners which required licensed radiologists who
furnish "diagnostic radiological services" to physicians (plenary li-
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censees) to furnish the same services to chiropractors and other limited
licensees upon request. Failure to provide such services would constitute "purposeful and intentional discrimination," and possibly subject
the radiologist to disciplinary action by the Board. 177 N.J. Super. at
526, 427 A.2d at 105. Appellants had applied to the superior court
and to the state supreme court to stay the effectiveness of the rule
pending appeal. These applications were denied. Id.
Prior to promulgation of the rule, the Board conducted an informal inquiry into alleged discriminatory practices of Monmouth Radiologists, a professional association of medical and osteopathic physicians, and two of its members, Dr. Brodie and Dr. Irving Stein. Id. at
527, 427 A.2d at 105. The Board concluded that existing discrimination against limited licensees was not in the best public interest, and
may be found to constitute professional misconduct pursuant to state
law. Id. at 528, 427 A.2d at 106. The Board ordered Dr. Brodie and
Dr. Stein to discontinue their discriminatory practices based upon
license classifications. Id. Dr. Brodie and Dr. Stein commenced suit in
the superior court, chancery division, seeking, inter alia, an injunction and a declaratory judgment. Id. The chancery court dismissed
the suit when the Board rescinded its threat of disciplinary action and
decided to resolve the issue by rule. Id. at 528, 427 A.2d at 107.
The proposed rule was published and interested parties were
invited to submit comment. Id. Believing that a public hearing was
not warranted, the Board adopted the rule as proposed after the
receipt of comments. Id. at 529, 427 A.2d at 107.
The bases of the appeal to review the rule were: (1) the contention that the rule constituted illegal Board interference with the radiologists' right to freedom of contract, exercise of independent judgment, and right of privacy; (2) a challenge as to the Board's authority
to adopt the rule due to allegedly "unconstitutionally excessive delegation of power" by the legislature and that the Board acted beyond its
"enabling authority"; and (3) the lack of a full evidentiary hearing.
Id. at 526, 427 A.2d at 105.
The court stated that the rule did not illegally interfere with
radiologists' right to freedom of contract, abridge their right of privacy, or interfere with their exercise of professional judgment. Id. at
531, 427 A.2d at 108.
The court held that the Board, as the legislatively authorized
administrative agency regulating medicine, surgery, and chiropractic,
had broad authority to set rules "to protect the health, safety and
welfare of patients of its licensees." Id. at 529, 427 A.2d at 107.
Furthermore, asserting that the questioned rule was intended to protect chiropractors' patients, the court held that chiropractors should
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not be denied access to radiological services for their patients. Id. at
530, 427 A.2d at 107.
The court found that the Board had full statutory power to issue
the rule, and that it did so properly and reasonably. Id. at 531, 427
A.2d at 108. Rejecting appellants' contention that they were entitled
to a full evidentiary hearing, the court determined that the Board had
complied with the state's Administrative Procedure Act by giving
proper notice and an opportunity to comment. Id. at 530-31, 427
A.2d at 108.
Stating that a Board rule is presumed valid and reasonable unless
proven otherwise, the court held that appellants did not overcome the
presumption. Id. at 532, 427 A.2d at 109. The court found sufficient
support for the challenged rule, affirmed the rule's adoption, and
dismissed the radiologists' appeal. Id.
This decision reaffirms the court's reluctance to overturn the
determination of a statutorily authorized Board absent some egregious
violation of due process or failure to conform to its own regulations.
As long as the time honored standards of fundamental fairness and
due process are observed, particularly in view of the fact that the
promulgated rule is peculiarly within the expertise of the professional
Board, the burden of persuading a court to overturn such a rule,
regulation, or decision, weighs heavily on the appellant.
A.K.

MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-LIBEL-GovEaNMENT ENTITIES
CANNOT MAINTAIN AcTiONS FOR DEFAMATION IN THEIR OWN

RIGHT-Weymouth Board of Education v. Wolf, 178 N.J. Super.
481, 429 A.2d 431 (Law Div. 1981).
The Weymouth Township Board of Education brought an action
for defamation in superior court against a taxpayers' association and
some of its members. The plaintiff alleged that the defendants had
made certain remarks, the substance of which suggested that the
Board had misused, lost, or embezzled a large portion of school board
funds. The plaintiff further claimed that the statements were false,
and that the defendants maliciously published the statements with the
intent to injure the Board. 178 N.J. Super. at 482, 429 A.2d at 431.
The defendants moved for summary judgment, raising the question of
whether a governmental entity can maintain an action for defamation
in its own right. Id.
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The instant case was one of first impression in New Jersey. Therefore, the court looked to the holdings of other jurisdictions for guidance. The court noted that the few courts that have considered the
question have concluded that a governmental entity can not maintain
an action for defamation. Id. at 482-83, 429 A.2d at 431-32.
The trial court, in holding that a governmental entity cannot
maintain an action for defamation in its own right, relied on Chicago
v. Tribune Co., 307 Ill. 595, 139 N.E. 86 (1923). In that case, the
City of Chicago charged the defendant newspaper with maliciously
publishing a series of articles which falsely claimed that the city was
insolvent because of poor management by the administration. 178
N.J. Super. at 482, 429 A.2d at 431. The court held that speech or
writing which criticized a governmental entity was absolutely privileged unless the speech or action attempted to persuade others to
violate existing laws or to overthrow the government. Id. at 482-83,
429 A.2d at 431.
The trial court concurred with the logic of the Chicago court.
The court reasoned that when a citizen expresses his views on government he is discharging his public duties, and, therefore, must be given
the same privileges as others engaged in the administration of justice.
Id. at 484, 429 A.2d at 432.
The court also cited New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254
(1964), which, although it did not include any claims on behalf of a
governmental entity, reiterated the conclusion of Chicago that prosecutions for libel of government have no place in American jurisprudence. 178 N.J. Super. at 484, 429 A.2d at 432.
In granting defendants' motion for summary judgment, the court
rejected as illogical and irrelevant the plaintiff's argument that the
principles outlined in Chicago be confined to situations where the
financial policies of governmental entities were criticized. Id. at 484,
429 A.2d at 432. The court, emphasizing that the privilege involved is
absolute, also disregarded the suggestion that the privilege attaches
only when the criticism was leveled at governmental entities which
were inefficient and corrupt. Id. at 484-85, 429 A.2d at 432-33.
The defendants further asserted that although the New Jersey
Constitution gives every person the right to speak, write, and publish
his views on all subjects, each person is responsible for his abuse of
that right. Although the court acknowledged the truth of this argument, it pointed out that along with guaranteeing free speech, the
constitution also recognizes the right of the people to make their
opinions known to their representatives, "and to petition for redress of
grievances." N.J. CONST. art. I, § 18 (1947). The court was careful to
note that criticism of government, not persons, was insulated. The
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recognition of an absolute privilege for criticism of governmental
entities, however, does not preclude individual members of the entity
from bringing suit. 178 N.J. Super. at 485, 429 A.2d at 433.
The court's holding emphasizes that the citizens' right to criticize
their government is a fundamental principle of the American system.
The court's refusal to allow governmental entities to maintain actions
against those who exercise this fundamental right is indicative of the
court's determination to safeguard the right and preclude any chilling
effect on its exercise.
J.A.W.

PRODUCTS LIABILITY-THEOFuES
LIABILITY HELD INAPPLICABLE IN

OF ALTERNATIVE AND ENTERPRISE

DES

CASES ABSENT LEGISLATIVE

v. Charles E. Frost & Co., 178 N.J. Super.
19, 427 A.2d 1121 (App. Div. 1981).

IMPRIMATu-Namm

Gail Namm and her husband, Paul Namm, brought a products
liability action against forty-four drug manufacturing and distributing companies for damages sustained by Gail as a result of her
mother's ingestion of one of the prescription drugs "diethylstilbestrol,"
"stilbestrol" or "dienestrol," synthetic estrogens commonly called
DES. Her mother used this drug in 1948 while pregnant because at
the time DES was thought to be helpful in preventing spontaneous
abortions. In August 1975, Gail was diagnosed as having adenocarcinoma of the vagina and underwent a total abdominal hysterectomy.
178 N.J. Super. at 24-25, 427 A.2d at 1123-24.
Plaintiffs filed a complaint on August 1, 1977. Because the passage of time had faded memories and records were lost, discovery
failed to reveal the identity of the specific drug which caused the
damage or its manufacturer. The trial judge granted defendants'
motion for summary judgment as to all defendants and the appellate
division affirmed. Id. at 26, 35, 427 A.2d at 1124, 1129.
DES cases have proliferated in recent years. Because diagnoses of
the diseases caused by DES may not take place until twenty years or
more after exposure to the drug, a plaintiff ordinarily bears a heavy
burden of proof in identifying the drug and its manufacturer, and in
causally linking the manufacturer, the drug, and the disease. Therefore, a plaintiff usually alleges defendant liability in negligence,
breach of warranty, and strict liability. Generally, courts hold to the
proposition that imposition of liability depends upon the plaintiff
showing that his or her injuries were caused by the defendant's act, or
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by an instrumentality under the defendant's control. Recently, however, certain theories of liability have been proffered which attempt
to overcome the identification barrier.
In New Jersey, there is a "strong policy which favors recovery by
innocently injured plaintiffs who would not otherwise recover because
they cannot identify the source of their injuries." Lyons v. Premo
PharmaceuticalLabs, Inc., 170 N.J. Super. 183, 192-93, 406 A.2d
190 (App. Div. 1979). In an attempt to overcome the identification
problem, the plaintiffs in Namm relied upon theories of liability
which have been described as "alternative liability," "concert of
action," and "enterprise liability." Plaintiffs contended that application of any one of these theories in their case would have precluded
the grant of summary judgment. 178 N.J. Super. at 27, 427 A.2d at
1165.
Alternative liability applies to situations where a plaintiff is unable to determine which of a number of potential tortfeasors is actually liable for his or her injury, or is unable to determine the share of
each for joint liability. Plaintiffs in the instant case argued that where
the "presumption of liability verging toward a certainty is against one
or more of the defendants," the theory of alternative liability shifts the
burden to each defendant to prove that it is not the manufacturer of
the pills ingested by the plaintiffs mother. Id. at 28, 427 A.2d at 1165.
Concert of action or joint action is usually described by analogy to a
drag race. Plaintiff, a bystander, is injured by A's car which has been
participating in a drag race with cars driven by B and C. Under a
concert of action theory, plaintiff may sue A, B, or C either individually or collectively, because their mere particiption was in and of itself
tortious. Under an enterprise theory, liability is imposed upon defendants collectively because the acceptance of DES by the medical profession was a direct result of a massive promotion and marketing campaign to which all defendants contributed, and through which all
defendants benefited. Id. at 34, 427 A.2d at 1128.
The appellate court noted that courts in other jurisdictions had
accepted one or more of the newer theories advanced by the DES
plaintiffs. See Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607
P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132 (1980) (accepted variation of alternative
liability whereby drug manufacturer, though not specifically identified as producer of ingested drug, was nevertheless held accountable
for its market share of production). The recent New York case of
BichIer v. Eli Lilly & Co., 79 A.D.2d 317, 435 N.Y.S.2d 625 (1981)
and the New Jersey case of Ferrigno v. Eli Lilly & Co., 175 N.J.
Super. 551, 420 A.2d 1305 (Law Div. 1980), both held that even
though plaintiffs were unable to determine which defendants manu-
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factured, distributed, and sold the drugs involved, it was appropriate
to shift the burden of proof to the defendants. Manufacturers who
failed to exculpate themselves were liable to the extent of their share
of the market. The appellate court, however, rejected these newer
theories.
The court disagreed with the plaintiffs' contention that the burden of proof should shift to the defendants because of the complexities
of identification. It held that nothing inherent in the conduct of the
defendants or in the manufacture of DES created a "complexity of
identification." 178 N.J. Super. at 32, 427 A.2d at 1127. Furthermore, nothing in the record suggested that any defendant was in a
better position to make the required identification than were the
plaintiffs.
The court believed that application of alternative liability to any
or all of the forty-four defendants would result in imposition of liability without fault upon anyone who manufactured a product which
was manufactured by others as well. "It would result in the taking of
the property of all the named defendants in order to pay for harm
which may have been caused by only one of the defendants, or even
by one who is not a party to the lawsuit." Id. at 33, 427 A.2d at 1128.
The court also rejected the enterprise liability theory, which even
the plaintiffs acknowledged was contrary to state law. The court held
that application of this theory would result in the abandonment of the
well-settled principle that manufacturers are responsible only for
damage caused by a defective product upon proof that the product
was defective, and that the defect arose while the product was in the
defendant's control. Id. at 34, 427 A.2d at 1129. Also, traditional
methods of apportioning damages among defendants would have to
be discarded and new ones developed. Id. at 35, 427 A.2d at 1129.
Finally, the appellate court stated that it must adhere to existing
state law, and that "in the absence of appropriate amendatory legislation 'any departure from it should be undertaken by the court of last
resort and not by the appellate division.' "Id. at 34, 427 A.2d at 1128
(quoting Sikagy v. State, 105 N.J. Super. 507, 510, 253 A.2d 478, 480
(App. Div. 1969)).
The reluctance of the appellate court to impose liability on unidentified drug manufacturers is clearly contrary to the modern trend
of risk allocation. Requiring a plaintiff to identify the defendant when
a drug or chemical related illness is discovered many years after initial
exposure, and even in the next generation, places too great a burden
upon the innocent plaintiff. The theory of alternative liability,
adopted in some form by the California Supreme Court in Sindell, the
appellate division of the New York supreme court in Bichler, and the

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 12:152

New Jersey superior court in Ferrigno,permits the plaintiff to recover
once the DES ingested is satisfactorily linked to the disease. A drug
company, whose profits were earned through the trust of the public,
should be responsible for damage caused by the use of its product in
proportion to its fair market share of the industry.
W.M.R.

TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES-ORAL

REVOCATION OF ExPnRiss INTER
Vivos TRUST OF REAL PROPERTY VALID IF REVOCATION PROVEN BY
CLEAR AND

CONVINCINc

EVIDENCE-Gabel v. Manetto, 177 N.J.

Super. 460, 427 A.2d 71 (App. Div. 1981).
On March 7, 1964, Joseph Manetto executed a trust agreement
which designated rental property owned by him as the trust res. On
the same date, Mr. Manetto conveyed the subject premises to his son,
Peter Manetto, as trustee. The bargain and sale deed contained a
specific reference to the trust agreement itself. Both instruments were
subsequently recorded in the Essex County Register's Office. 177 N.J.
Super. at 462, 427 A.2d at 72. Although the terms of the trust agreement provided for the disbursement of the net income from the res
during the life of the settlor and his wife, it explicitly directed that
after the death of both parties, the property was to be sold and the
proceeds distributed equally among the settlor's four children.
After Mr. Manetto's death in November of 1976, his wife having
predeceased him, plaintiff Gloria Gabel, daughter of the settlor, instituted an action seeking either partition of the property, or enforcement of the provisions of the trust agreement. In filing a joint answer
to Mrs. Gabel's suit, the remaining three children alleged that the
trust had been orally revoked prior to their father's death, and that,
upon his death, title to the rental property vested in the three children
by devise under their father's will dated September 23, 1975. The
terms of the will left $2,000 in cash to Mrs. Gabel, the testator's
daughter by a second marriage, with the remaining property, real
and personal, to be divided equally among the three children of the
first marriage. Id. at 462-63, 427 A.2d at 72.
Central to the issue of the validity of the alleged oral revocation
of the inter vivos trust of real property was the fact that the trust
agreement, while specifically vesting the settlor with the power to
amend, alter, or revoke the trust, was silent as to methods of revocation. Id. at 462, 427 A.2d at 72. In a nonjury trial, the lower court
held as a matter of law that such a trust could not be orally revoked.
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Id. at 465, 427 A.2d at 73. The appellate court disagreed, finding
support in the general statement of legal authorities which the court
summarized: "where no method of revocation is specified in the instrument creating an inter vivos trust, it may be revoked by any
method which sufficiently proves the intention of the settlor to revoke
it." Id. at 463, 427 A.2d at 72.
Addressing Mrs. Gabel's three arguments in support of the necessity of a written revocation, the court initially rejected the applicability of the Statute of Frauds. As distinguished from the extinguishment
of a trust through revocation, the Statute of Frauds provisions requiring a writing were found to pertain either to the declaration and
creation of a trust involving real property, or to the assignment,
grant, or surrender of an interest in real property. Id. at 463-64, 427
A.2d at 72-73.
A second argument looked to the language of the trust agreement
which specified that a release of the settlor's power to amend, alter, or
revoke must be in writing. Mrs. Gabel contended that a strong inference could be drawn from this provision that a revocation of the trust
itself must be in writing. The court concluded otherwise, finding the
absence of an express clause requiring a revocation to be in writing to
be indicative of the settlor's intention to retain the power to orally
amend, alter, or revoke. Id. at 464, 427 A.2d at 73. Lastly, the court
rejected Mrs. Gabel's "equal dignity" argument that the trust, having
been created by a written instrument, should likewise be revoked by a
written instrument. Id. at 465, 427 A.2d at 73.
In a cautionary note, the court added that Mr. Manetto's act of
executing a will cannot be construed as a revocation of the trust
agreement since, by the very nature of a will, it does not take effect
until the testator's death. It is thus not the "proper instrument to
revoke a trust when the power to do so is an intervivos power." Id. at
466, 427 A.2d at 74.
Although the court reversed the holding of the trial court with
respect to the question of law raised, the court remanded the case for
consideration of whether the facts established a revocation since the
evidence presented below was conflicting. In this regard, the court
directed that the burden of proof in establishing revocation should be
"'on the party asserting it and must be proved by clear and convincing
evidence." Id. at 465, 427 A.2d at 73.
The holding of the appellate court that a written inter vivos trust
can be orally revoked, even if the res of the trust is real property, is an
issue of first impression in this state. Given the possibility of fabricated
claims of revocation, due caution should be exercised to guard against
such fraud.
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BARRING PENNY AR-

CADES INVALIDATED AS ULTRA ViREs LOCAL POLICE

PowEms-Super-

cade Cherry Hill, Inc. v. Borough of Eatontown, 178 N.J. Super.
152, 428 A.2d 530 (App. Div. 1981); America on Wheels, Eatontown, Inc. v. Board of Adjustment of the Borough of Eatontown,
178 N.J. Super. 155, 428 A.2d 532 (App. Div. 1981).
On March 11, 1981, the appellate division decided two companion cases concerning the validity of a zoning ordinance of the Borough
of Eatontown banning penny arcades. 178 N.J. Super. 152, 428 A.2d
530; 178 N.J. Super. 155, 428 A.2d 532.
Supercade Cherry Hill, Inc., a New Jersey corporation, challenged a zoning regulation which prohibited "places of amusement or
entertainment wherein are to be found games, coin-operated amusement, movie or entertainment machines." Eatontown, N.J., Ordinance 89.7.15.3.
Affirming the judgment of the lower court, Judge Allcorn found
the regulation at issue to be "arbitrary and unreasonable." 178 N.J.
Super. at 154, 428 A.2d at 531. Because there was no evidence that
the regulation protected the "legitimate interests of the municipality
or its inhabitants," the court held that the bar on penny arcades failed
to bear the required "reasonable and substantial relationship" to public health, safety, and welfare objectives. Id. In conclusion, Judge
Allcorn found the exclusion antithetical to purposes of the state Land
Use Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:55D-1 to :55D-92 (West Cum. Supp.
1981-1982), calling for adequate and appropriate locations for recreational uses, among a variety of uses, designed to meet the needs of all
its citizens. 178 N.J. Super. at 154, 428 A.2d at 530. Upon these bases
the appellate division found the zoning ordinance invalid.
In the companion case, 178 N.J. 155, 428 A.2d 532, America on
Wheels, Eatontown, Inc., the plaintiff and owner of a roller rink
located in the municipality, was granted a variance to Eatontown,
N.J., Ordinance 89.7.15.3, upon its request to install coin-operated
amusement machines in its rink. Id. at 156, 428 A.2d at 533. Its use,
however, was restricted to two machines. For the reasons set forth in

Supercade, Judge Allcorn also held such a restriction to be invalid and
ultra vires local police powers. Accordingly, Judge Allcorn reversed
the judgment of the law division and ordered issuance of licenses

permitting installation of the eight additional amusement machines
requested by plaintiff. Id.
The decisions in Supercade and its companion case, America on
Wheels, were implicitly based upon constitutional grounds, and explicitly based on statutory grounds. They recognized "the broad and
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comprehensive authority delegated to municipalities to adopt and
enforce zoning ordinances." 178 N.J. Super. at 153, 154, 428 A.2d at
531. The municipality of Eatontown exceeded its police powers in
arbitrarily and unreasonably defining recreation to exclude all coinoperated amusement facilities. The Supercade court found no legitimate interest upon which the municipality could base such restrictions. This holding, and that in America on Wheels, is consistent with
the New Jersey supreme court's decision in Baker v. Carr, 81 N.J. 99,
405 A.2d 368 (1979), which held that the court may invalidate discriminatory and exclusionary zoning. The significance of these decisions, however, is that they extend judicial constraints on municipal
zoning powers beyond merely residential matters. In light of this
expansion of judicial consideration of exclusionary zoning ordinances,
and in view of the appellate court's definition of "recreation," it is
possible that courts will assume a more activist stance regarding commercial zoning matters.
L.J.B.

